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1 It has become quite common to read economic forecasts predicting that China’s GDP
will  catch  up  with  Japan’s  GDP  in  2010  and  with  US’  GDP  in  2020.  Outlining  the
successes  of  firms  like  Haier,  Kelon  or  Lenovo  (formerly  Legend),  some  analysts
perceive the emergence of world class Chinese multinational enterprises that would
eventually  catch  up  with  their  Asian  and  Western  counterparts  (FT,  2003,  21/12).
Chinese  firms  would  be  a  similar  situation  today  than the Japanese  keiretsu  or  the
Korean chaebol at the beginning of their international expansion. Some even claim that
China could “leapfrog” technologically the newly industrialised countries of East Asia
like South Korea. 
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The flying geese pattern
The successive waves of Japanese FDI and the industrialisation of
East Asia
2 According to this view, China would break the so-called “flying geese” pattern that has
been characterizing the East Asian economies for the last decades. The “flying geese”
theory was first conceived by Akamatsu Kaname, a Japanese scholar in the 1930s. It
emphasized the role that the Japanese economy could play in the development of the
emerging East Asian economies (Yamamura, 1997, p. 27). Massive flows of Japanese FDI
across  the  region  would  create  an  industrial  base  and  technological  spin-offs  that
would  induce  successive  take-offs  of  Japan’s  neighbours  as  Japanese  multinational
enterprises  (MNEs)  would  accelerate  their  geographic  expansion  in  Asia.  The
development  of  the  East  Asian  economies  would  resemble  the  characteristic  “V-
shaped” flight of geese with the Japanese economy playing the role of the leader of the
flock. The “flying geese” model experienced a revival in the 1960s when the Japanese
MNEs  began  to  relocate  some  of  their  labour-intensive  activities  to  neighbouring
economies such as Taiwan and South Korea. The “flying geese” model is now currently
used by economists and other scholars to explain the industrialisation of East Asia. 
3 The “flying geese” pattern has been supported by strong evidence. Numerous scholars
have  highlighted  the  decisive  role  played  by  the  Japanese  MNEs  in  the  economic
integration of the East Asian region (Yamamura, 1997; Hatch, 2000; Yoshihama, 1988;
Oman, 1994; Hobday, 1995 & Jones, 1997). Successive waves of Japanese (and US) FDI
have helped to industrialise the former Japanese colonies of Taiwan and South Korea in
the  1960s,  then  reached  the  ASEAN  economies  in  the  1980s  and  finally  China  and
Vietnam.  The  Japanese  keiretsu and  their  subcontractors  have  regionalized  their
process of production and built a complex regional division of labour in East Asia.
4 Among  the  East  Asian  economies,  South  Korea,  Taiwan,  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore
hosted the first major wave of FDI in the 1960s. Thanks to spin-off, they managed to
industrialise  and  started  to  catch  up  with  the  most  advanced  economies.  Their
domestic firms acquired new technological knowledge and management experience,
which  provided  intangible  assets  necessary  to  transform some of  them into  global
competitors. Major MNEs like Samsung or ACER began to emerge. Korean, Taiwanese
and Singapore firms launched their own outflow of FDI in the late 1980s towards the
less developed neighbouring economies (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia). 
5 The other East Asian economies opened up later but they too were transformed by the
second major wave of Japanese FDI that began to take place in the late 1980s after the
endaka (the appreciation of the yen that resulted from the 1985 Plaza Accord). Their
economies  also  began  to  industrialize  and  some  local  companies  upgraded  their
technological capabilities even though none has yet managed to transform into major
MNEs capable of generating substantial FDI outflows. 
6 Since the mid 1990s,  however,  the Asian newly industrialised countries (NICs)  have
been  in  crisis.  The  fantastic  increase  in  GDP  per  capita  that  these  economies  had
experienced began to slow down and even stagnate during the last decade. The trade
structure of the Asian NICs still indicates a high dependence on Japan for high-tech
imports. Many analysts remain sceptical about the innovation capacities of most of the
non-Japanese Asian MNEs. It is necessary now to assess to what extent the regional
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integration led by Japanese MNEs has helped to diffuse technological capacities in the
region and what the newcomers like China and Vietnam can expect from joining the
flock of “flying geese”.
7 There  is  abundant  evidence  that  the  Japanese  subsidiaries  have  transmitted
technological  capacities  to  their  local  subcontractors  in  many  Asian  economies.
Technical  blueprints  and/or  advice  provided  by  technical  staff  are  given  by  the
Japanese MNEs to their subcontracting firms so as to improve the quality, design and
conformity of  the inputs.  A study conducted by Rhee has shown that about 50% of
South  Korean  firms  benefited  from  such  technology  transfers  from  their  Japanese
buyers (Hobday, 1995, p. 37). Japanese MNEs like Hitachi have played a similar role in
the upgrading of the technological capacity of Taiwanese firms in the field of PCs and
electronics (Hobday, 1995, p. 106). This transmission started in the 1960s and 1970s for
Taiwan and South Korea and was extended to the ASEAN economies after the endaka. In
Thailand  for  example,  Japanese  firms  opened  joint-ventures  in  the  textile  sector.
Progressively, they lost their dominant position as Thai capital accumulated and the
Thais gained the necessary technological  skills.  Thai firms then began to phase out
progressively  their  Japanese  partners  (Yoshihara,  1988,  p. 31).  More  generally,  the
rising value of the yen implied a further use of locally produced parts. This forced the
establishment of quality circles in local subsidiaries (Doner, 1993, p. 180), which in turn
led to an improvement in local production standards and in the technological skills of
the  local  staff.  All  these  facts  clearly  indicate  the  existence  of  a  diffusion  of
technological knowledge. The real question is,  was it sufficient to create indigenous
innovative capacities?
8 In the cases of Taiwan and Korea, some firms have managed to transform themselves
into  global  competitors  in  capital-intensive  and  high-tech  manufacturing  sectors.
Chaebol like  Samsung,  LG  or  Hyundai  and  Taiwanese  firms  like  ACER have  become
internationally  well-known  brands.  The  chaebol have  opened  subsidiaries  in  North
America  and  Europe.  For  the  other  Asian  economies,  no  domestic  firms  have  yet
managed to reach that technological level or to open as many subsidiaries outside the
East  Asian  region.  Yet,  some  Thailand-based  firms  are  important  exporters  of
electronic goods and Malaysia has created its own car industry. These are obvious signs
of industrial development that are not yet matched by any other region in the world.
 
Assessing the performance of the most advanced flying geese: FDI
outflows and indigenous innovative capabilities in Taiwan and
South Korea
9 The  South  Korean  and  Taiwanese  firms  have  achieved  astounding  success.  Both
economies have transformed themselves from FDI recipient countries into generators
of FDI outflows. Nevertheless, these achievements need to be put into perspective. All
of these firms still depend on Japanese technology for high-tech inputs and machinery
(Yamamura,  1997,  p. 88).  The  example  of  Samsung  is  enlightening.  Samsung  is
considered to be an exception in South Korea for its massive investment in high tech
capacities (Yamamura, 1997). It has pursued a risky and determinate policy to invest in
long-term research in the US despite heavy short-term losses (Hobday,  1995,  p. 82).
Nevertheless, it still lacks the design skills to produce key final goods in the computer
industry.  It  is  still  dependent  on  Japanese  and US  imports  of  high-tech machinery
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(Hobday,  1995,  p. 85).  By  the  end  of  the  1990s  Samsung  did  not  possess  the  R&D
capacities to go beyond incremental innovation in mature and mainstream products
(Hobday, 1995, p. 87). The scope of its products was still limited in 2002, although the
firm was still engaged in ambitious R&D plans to extend its expertise and catch up with
its Japanese competitors (Dicken, 2003). In his thoughtful study of technology diffusion
in East Asia, Hobday concludes that, as late as the mid 1990s, the chaebol were still far
behind  their  Japanese  competitors  in  terms  of  R&D,  science,  key  components  and
advanced raw materials (Hobday, 1995, p. 90). Despite strenuous efforts to reduce their
dependence on Japanese technology and South Korea being the most important R&D
spender among the Asian NICs, the structure of the bilateral Korean-Japanese trade
indicates that there is an important trade deficit in high-tech products on the Korean
side (Liu, 1996, p. 157). Through their interviews, Yamamura and Hatch have found that
many South Korean economists and businessmen believed that the technological gap
between South Korea and Japan was actually widening in 1997 (Yamamura, 1997, p. 90).
The Asian crisis  of  1997  did  not  improve this  situation as  the  restructuring of  the
chaebol became the priority.
10 The situation of the most advanced Taiwanese firms is no different. Taiwanese leaders
like ACER have acquired companies in the USA in order to improve their innovative
capacities but have met little success because of the different management styles, the
lack of motivation of American staff or because the best US researchers moved to other
US companies (Gee, 1992, p. 37). ACER has tried to develop its brand worldwide. In 1988,
as  much  as  60%  of  ACER’s  output  was  sold  under  its  own  brand  but  this  strategy
generated heavy losses. ACER had to scale down its operations and reduce the share of
“own-brand”  sales  (Hobday,  1995,  p. 116). Like  their  South  Korean  competitors,
Taiwanese firms still have to rely heavily on Japanese high-tech equipment and key
inputs (Hobday, 1995, p. 108).
 
Assessing the performance of the rest of the flock of flying geese:
Indigenous innovative capabilities in the rest of East Asia and the
notion of ersatz capitalism
11 For the other East Asian economies, the dependency on the Japanese MNEs is much
stronger. Apart from Taiwan and South Korea, Singapore is the only economy of the
region, which had an ambitious education program to improve the skills of technicians
and engineers (Yamamura, 1997, p. 83). But for three decades, this policy aimed mainly
at  providing  foreign  MNEs  with  skilled  local  personal  rather  than  to  support  the
creation of indigenous manufacturing firms (Hobday, 1995, p. 141). The recent change
of government policy during the late 1980s has modified this situation but the new
Singapore-based MNEs are developing mainly in regional services (Nesadurai, 2003, p. 
87). To pursue this strategy, they do not require the highest level of management and
scientific skills. This implies that Singapore is still very much dependant upon Japanese
and Western technology. The other Asian economies have not invested sufficiently to
build a technological and scientific base comparable to Japan or even South Korea. The
share  of  skilled  workers  among the  domestic  workforce  of  most  ASEAN economies
(except Singapore) was still very low by the late 1990s. In Malaysia (which is considered
more advanced than Indonesia or the Philippines), this figure only reached 2.4%, far
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below  the  take-off  stage  that  advanced  economies  like  Japan  experienced  decades
before (Yamamura, 1997, p. 83).
12 Many  indigenous  firms  in  ASEAN  economies  are  completely  dependent  on  their
Japanese partners,  even those which are strongly protected and subsidised by their
government.  Within  the  ASEAN economies,  indigenous  high-tech  industries  able  to
compete  on the  global  markets  have  not  emerged yet  despite  decades  of  intensive
industrial policies. This situation is reflected by the limited FDI outflows. Apart from
Singapore, all ASEAN economies are characterized by much stronger FDI inflows than
outflows (UNCTAD, 2004). 
13 Since  1971,  Malaysia  has  been  pursuing  a  nationalist  policy  to  support  indigenous
Malay  entrepreneurs  and  upgrade  the  indigenous  industrial  capacities.  This  policy,
named the New Economic Policy (NEP), forced foreign investors to develop through
joint ventures with indigenous Malay. The Japanese MNEs actually adapted far better to
that situation than the Western firms, which preferred to open fully owned subsidiaries
(Yoshihara, 1988, p. 24). In the 1990s, the Malaysian Prime Minister Matathir Mohamad,
who was one of the main designers of the NEP, eventually admitted that this highly
costly  policy  was  not  reaching  its  original  goal  of  creating  an  innovative  and
competitive class of Malay entrepreneurs. Rules on FDI were relaxed throughout the
decade (Jones, 1997, p. 114).  In early 2000, the last remnants of the NEP were being
progressively phased out (FT, Malaysia Report 2003). Malaysian firms are still totally
dependant on MNEs in high-tech sectors. A good example of this development is the
Malaysian Proton Saga carmaker, which was considered by Matathir as a key project to
develop  an  autonomous  indigenous  capital-intensive  industry.  It  was  a  developed
under  a  joint-venture  between  the  state-owned  Heavy  Industries  Corporation  and
Mitsubishi  Motor  Corporation (MCC).  Despite  local  content  rules,  MMC was  able  to
disqualify  indigenous  producers  by  imposing  strict  quality  control  that  only  its
traditional  subcontractors could achieve (Yamamura,  1997,  p. 35).  At  the end of  the
process, the Japanese MNE had the effective control of the joint-venture. Proton Saga
was incorporated in the regional network of MMC’s subsidiaries and produced door
panels for other MMC subsidiaries (Yamamura, 1997, p. 35). In 2003, Proton Saga was
still  dependent upon foreign technology.  Most analysts do not believe it  capable of
competing on the global  market (that is,  without the strong domestic  barriers that
protect  it  presently)  (FT  Malaysia  Report  2003).  It  is  even  less  probable  that  the
Malaysian engineers alone could develop the new models of the Proton in the near
future. 
14 During the 1990s, the Indonesian authorities tried to imitate the Malaysian NEP. They
adopted a strong industrial policy to support the emergence of high-tech indigenous
groups in order to diminish their reliance on foreign technology (Nesadurai, 2003, p. 
120). In 1989, General Suharto gave the supervision of ten state-owned companies in
transport, telecoms and defence to the minister of research Dr Habibie (Jones, 1997, p. 
123).  This  included  an  aeronautics  firm  in  charge  of  developing  a  prototype  for  a
commercial  airplane,  the  N-250.  Most  of  these  projects  were  controlled  by  close
members  of  the  Suharto family  and ended in  failure.  The crisis  of  1997 forced the
Indonesian government to scale down its subsidies and to open further their market.
The Japanese MNEs continue to be the main supplier of technology to Indonesia.
15 The Philippines with the small size of its economy and being one of the least developed
countries of the region could not hope to build indigenous autonomous technological
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innovation capacities. They adopted many protectionist measures to pursue an import-
substitution industrialisation for decades but are still dependent upon Japanese and US
technology. No Filipino firm is expected to transform itself into a global competitor in a
foreseeable future. 
16 Thailand has been a more open economy than the other large ASEAN member states. It
adopted exported-oriented policies  with  an important  reliance  on FDI  in  the  1970s
(Katzenstein,  1993,  p. 226).  After  the  endaka,  Thailand  became  one  of  the  most
important destinations of Japanese FDI in Asia. The Japanese government designed a
“new  aid  plan”  for  Thailand,  which  provided  loans  and  facilitated  administrative
procedures for the relocation of activities by Japanese firms to Thailand (Katzenstein,
1993, p. 228). The Thai conglomerates became partners in joint-ventures established by
the  Japanese  firms  which  controlled  the  technology.  An  example  of  the  Japanese
technological  and management  control  on large  Thai  firms is  the  Thai  corporation
Jubao  Electronics.  It  is  one  of  Thailand’s  most  successful  exporting  firms  but  the
patents  of  their  products  are  held  by  the  Japanese  MNE Sharp  which  imposes  the
technical  specifications,  Jubao’s  production  is  handed  to  Sharp  for  world  wide
distribution and it is sold under the Sharp brand (Yamamura, 1997, p. 57).
17 To  describe  the  situation  of  the  ASEAN  economies,  Yoshihara  has  developed  the
concept  of  ersatz capitalism.  Despite  their  industrialisation and the  development  of
large local capitalist enterprises, the ASEAN economies are not capable of innovative
capabilities and of competing on a global level. This situation has turned local capitalist
and entrepreneurs into rent-seekers sheltered by the state subsidies and protectionist
measures or into “comprador” capitalists “acting as agent of foreign manufacturers”
(Yoshihara,  1988,  p. 3).  Neither  the  “crony  or  bureaucratic”  capitalists  nor  the
“comprador” have the ambition to transform themselves into global competitors. Their
survival depends upon their local government intervention or upon foreign technology
(Yoshihara, 1988, p. 130). Their aim is to grab a share of the rents that can be generated
in a domestic a market characterised by an opaque institutional framework.
 
Japan, the uncontested flying geese leader
18 Japan remains the uncontested technological leader of Asia. The webs that the Japanese
MNEs  have  built  through  the  regionalisation  of  their  production  process  have
generated  technological  spin-offs  but  these  were  far  from  giving  the  other  Asian
economies  a  sufficient  scientific  and  technological  base  to  develop  indigenous
innovation  capacities  in  most  of  the  high-tech  sectors.  The  dependency  of  Asian
economies on Japanese technology is much higher than what FDI figures could imply.
Technology licensing accounts for a substantial part of the Japanese firms activities in
East Asia (Yamamura, 1997).  The pattern of trade clearly indicates this dependence.
Japan maintains a trade surplus with all its East Asian partners (see figure 1). Among
the East Asian economies, Japan has got by far the highest share of high-tech products
in its total exports (Fukasaku, 1992, p. 17). Japanese exports machinery and high-tech
inputs to the East Asian economies, which in turn process manufactured goods and
export them to the global markets. The East Asian economies finance their trade deficit
with Japan, their trade surplus with the Western economies. 
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Figure 1. Japan’s trade surplus with its East Asian partners.
Source: IMF, 2004
19 The level of development (and when they were touched by waves of Japanese FDI), of
the indigenous firms of East Asian countries determines whether they produce more
capital-intensive  goods  (South  Korea  and  Taiwan)  or  more  labour-intensive  ones
(ASEAN except Singapore). Indigenous entrepreneurs from Hong Kong and Singapore,
thanks  their  traditional  role  as  regional  warehouse,  have  specialised  in  regional
services.  The Japanese MNEs have constituted their  regional  webs through FDI  and
licensing in which they control the technological diffusion (Yamamura, 1997, p. 102).
They have created a regional division of labour in which Japanese firms control most of
the operations in R&D, international management,  international distribution and in
advanced financial services. The R&D facilities and the headquarters of the keiretsu are
carefully maintained in Japan (Yamamura, 1997, p. 103). Japan certainly has managed to
develop and to keep dynamic clusters in R&D or “Marshallian districts” that provide
external  economies  of  scale  in  technological  innovation.  In  the  early  1990s,  Japan
ranked second in the world in scientific publications while South Korea was not even in
the top 30 with less than 4% of the number of Japanese publications (Hobday, 1995, p. 
64) and the gap has not been reduced during the rest of the decade (Yamamura, 1997, p.
90). The Japanese flying goose does not seem to be ready to give up its place as leader of
the gaggle.
20 Dependence on Japanese technology is an issue for most governments in the region.
Many officials and indigenous business leaders complain about the limited transfer of
technology and know-how by Japanese MNEs. There are considered across East Asia to
have a more reluctant attitude to the indigenisation of top management and research
operations  (Yamamura,  1997).  Some  Asian  economies  are  trying  to  reduce  their
reliance on Japanese technology but so far, their success has been mitigated. The most
obvious successes  were achieved by some of  the chaebol,  which have managed in a
narrow range of products to gain indigenous innovation capacities. Taiwanese firms
most probably rank second after the chaebol but their small size and their reliance on
Japanese (and US) key high-tech inputs and distribution networks means that they do
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not benefit from the same level of autonomy enjoyed by their Korean counterparts. The
other East Asian economies have never really tried (Singapore, Thailand or Hong Kong)
to build their own technological innovative capacities or have clearly failed (Malaysia’s
NEP and Indonesia Habibie’s high-tech projects). Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan are
the three economies that managed best to keep alternatives sources of technology by
hosting  many  Western  MNEs  but  this  has  not  reduced  the  reliance  on  foreign
technology. 
 
The optimistic scenario: China breaks away from the “flying geese”
pattern
21 Yet, some analysts claim that China could experience a more favourable situation than
its ASEAN counterparts because of the sheer size of its economy. Chinese enterprises
would break away from the traditional East Asian technological dependence vis-à-vis
Japan and would escape the fate of ersatz capitalism. This optimistic scenario is usually
based on a series of factors. Firstly, just like in the Korean case, the large flows of FDI
coming to China will generate spin-offs and ultimately provide the Chinese firms with
the intangible assets in technology and management they need in order to compete
with world-class multinational enterprises (MNEs). Secondly, the large Chinese market
will give domestic firm a strong base from which to expand on world markets after
having benefited from economies of scale and learning by doing. Thirdly, thanks to its
potentially huge domestic market, the bargaining position of the Chinese government
is stronger in imposing technological transfers by MNEs investing in China, thereby
imposing better conditions for the Chinese emerging leaders in industries and services.
Fourthly, even disregarding this more advantageous bargaining position, many MNEs
will prefer to invest R&D facilities in China to improve “time to market” and to be able
to react quicker to a volatile demand keen on new differentiated products (Kim & Lee,
2004,  p. 16).  Indeed,  some MNEs have recently  established R&D centres  for  product
development  aimed  at  the  Chinese  market  (Chen,  2004,  p. 13).  Finally,  MNEs  will
continue to be attracted by the cheap price and availability of high-quality Chinese
engineers (Chen, 2004, p. 13). No other developing Asian economies can offer such a
large pool of trained scientists. This enabled world class firms like IBM, Microsoft and
Intel to engage in basic technology research in China in collaboration with Chinese
universities and state-funded research institutes (Chen, 2004, p. 14). 
22 These developments have generated many fears from neighbouring economies such as
Taiwan  and  Korea  which  are  afraid  of  being  technologically  leapfrogged  by  China
(Chen,  2004,  p. 15  &  Nam, 2004,  p. 22).  Korean  economists  believe  that  China’s
technological gap behind Korea is shrinking. Some estimate this gap to be around three
to five years for many products (Nam, 2004, p. 22). One of the strongest views on the
matter was expressed by South Korea’s national science and technology committee. It
claimed in December 2003 that the country had a technological gap of only 1.7 years
over China and that it would be closed within five years (FT, 21/12/2003). 
23 If such a gap is actually being closed by Chinese firms, China would have achieved a
better performance than any other Asian economies. With such an ability to benefit
from  technological  spin-off,  Chinese  firms  could  even  hope  to  avoid  the  fate  of
technological  dependency  vis-à-vis  Japan  endured  by  the  other  Asian  “geese”.
Numerous Chinese firms would transform themselves into global MNEs, capable not
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only of competing with the firms of the intermediate economies, but even with the
Japanese keiretsu.  Chinese firms would become major foreign investors.  The Chinese
economy would break the traditional “flying geese pattern” and challenge Japan in its
economic leadership of East Asia.
24 The  following  sections  will  demonstrate  that  the  optimistic  scenario  of  such  a
phenomenal leapfrog by China does not resist a careful analysis of both FDI inflows
structure and the transformation of the socio-institutional framework of the Chinese
economy since the reforms were launched in 1978.  Therefore,  it  will  show that the
possibility of Chinese global competitors emerging, although not impossible, is much
more remote than some analysts claim. Japanese firms and even some Asian firms still
enjoy  a  considerable  advance  in  the  capacity  to  innovate  and  to  operate
internationally. China is unlikely to take over the leadership of the “flying geese”. 
 
An assessment of the current situation of Chinese
firms and their acquisition of ownership-specific
advantages 
25 In  order  to  determine  the  possibilities  of  China’s  reversing  the  “flying  geese”,
numerous Chinese firms would have to transform themselves into global competitors
capable of expanding abroad. This is different from enjoying a high trade surplus and
hosting  competitive  firms,  two  achievements  of  the  Chinese  economy.  What
distinguishes  the  advanced  OECD  economies  like  Japan  from  the  industrialised
developing countries is the existence, across most sectors of activity, of national firms
benefiting  from  what  Dunning  calls  “ownership-specific  advantages”  or  “O-
advantages” (Dunning, 1996, p. 79). These O-advantages are the intangible assets that
constitute barriers to entry in a particular sector of activity (Dunning, 1996, p. 81). They
include  notably  operating  at  a  sufficient  scale  to  minimize  costs  (the  so-called
“minimum efficiency size”), management know-how, innovative capabilities, goodwill
or privileged credit access. These intangible assets give enterprises a competitive edge
on the world markets  and enable  them to  invest directly  abroad and to  transform
themselves into MNEs. The enterprises that do not possess such O-advantages are stuck
into activities characterized by low barriers to entry and therefore low profit margins.
These are most often mature industries abandoned by the most efficient MNEs.
26 The crucial question for the future role that the Chinese economy could play in the East
Asia  and  on  global  markets  is  to  determine  if  the  Chinese  firms  could  acquire  O-
advantages  and  become  global  competitors  in  the  activities  characterised  by  high
barriers to entry, that is mostly the technological-intensive sectors.
27 If this is the case, the Chinese economy could soon compete with Japan as the driving
force  in  the  integration  of  the  East  Asian  economy.  Chinese  emerging  MNEs  could
follow  the  path  of  their  Japanese  counterparts  in  establishing  a  complex  regional
division of labour in East Asia. If Chinese firms cannot acquire such advantages, they
are bound to  join the pack of  East  Asian countries  that  participate  in  the regional
specialisation set up by the Japanese MNEs and Japanese institutions like the MITI or
Keidaren.  In that case, Japan would remain the leader of the so-called “flying geese”
economies. China could only hope to play the role of an auxiliary driving force in the
East Asian economy, lacking the innovative and management capabilities to lead the
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flying  geese.  Furthermore,  without  strong  national  champions  that  could  compete
globally in industries and services, China’s entrepreneurial class could resign itself to
playing  the  comprador  capitalist  specialised  in  the  activities  subcontracted  by  the
foreign MNEs or sheltered into state-protected sectors. China would then resemble to
the  ASEAN  economies  and  adopt  what  Yoshihara  has  called  an  “ersatz capitalism”
model (Yoshihara, 1988). 
28 Considering the arguments that have just been examined, it is necessary to assess the
current  situation  and  prospects  of  Chinese  firms  in  the  acquisition  process  of  O-
advantages.  Despite  the  fact  that  Chinese  statistics  are  scarce  and  are  not  always
accurate  for  that  purpose,  some  figures  can  provide  worthwhile  material  for  such
assessment.
 
How to measure the extent of O-advantages acquisition by Chinese
firms?
29 Firstly,  if  Chinese  firms  are  now  acquiring  O-advantages,  they  should  withstand
successfully  MNEs  competition  and  begin  to  export  around  world  markets  and
ultimately to invest abroad in activities that are intensive in capital and technology.
This  would  imply  that  FDI  constitutes  an important  share  of  investments  made by
Chinese firms.  FDI  outflows are therefore a  good indicator of  this  acquisition of  O-
advantages. Secondly, one must also analyse the FDI inflows as they might reflect the
lack of competitiveness of Chinese firms. One can naturally object that substantial FDI
inflows occur in OECD countries and they do not reflect an absence of strong global
competitors in these economies. However if in a given country, FDI inflows constitute a
substantial  part  of  gross  domestic  investment  and,  at  the  same  time,  dominate
massively the FDI outflows, it probably reflects the inability of local firms from this
country  to  acquire  O-advantage  in  most  of  the  sectors  intensive  in  capital  and
technology. Such relatively massive FDI inflows would indicate a high probability of
foreign  MNEs  taking  over  local  firms  in  these  sectors.  From  these  propositions,  a
comparative analysis of the respective FDI outflows and inflows from China and from
other Asian economies can contribute to reveal the extent of the catching up achieved
by Chinese firms over their Asian counterparts.
30 To acquire O-advantage for a firm is notably to be able to manage successfully large
scale operations. This requires the firm to reach the given current minimal efficient
size.  This induces that one has to compare the size of the Chinese firms with their
global competitors in sectors characterized by important economies of scale. However,
reaching a size in terms of assets is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the
acquisition of O-advantages. For a firm based in a developing economy (especially in
former centrally-planned economies),  a large size in terms of assets does not mean
necessarily that the later has adopted modern management and production techniques.
It could simply be the result of an extensive growth (based on quantitative increase of
the various factors of production) while firms that are in the process of acquiring O-
advantages have to pursue an intensive growth (based on a more efficient combination
and use of these factors of production). Therefore in order to create a clearer picture of
the extent  of  O-advantages  acquisition by the Chinese firms that  have reached the
minimal efficient size, one must observe other elements such as the capital intensity
and  the  return  on  assets.  One  could  argue  that  capital  intensity  is  not  a  relevant
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variable in the case of China. Indeed if the Chinese labour costs are much lower than in
other industrialized countries, why would efficient firms not choose a more labour-
intensive technology? This is to forget that sectors where O-advantages and barriers to
entry exist do not allow an ample choice of substitution between labour and capital. In
capital and technology intensive sectors, the production processes are characterised by
specific  machine-tools,  robots,  electronics  that  require  skilled  labour.  This  impedes
substitution between labour and capital. Ample evidence is available if one looks at the
production process of MNEs operating in China. Thus, relative capital intensity is still a
relevant variable to see if the large Chinese firms are upgrading their technological
capabilities. 
 
Comparing the performance of Chinese firms and their global
competitors
31 If Chinese firms are now acquiring O-advantages, they should withstand successfully
MNEs competition, begin to export around world markets and ultimately invest abroad
in activities that are intensive in capital and technology. On the contrary, looking at
FDI flows and comparing the performance of Chinese firms with those of the MNEs’
subsidiaries located in China brings to light worrying trends.
 
FDI inward flows and investment
32 China has attracted more FDI relatively to its GDP than large emerging economies and
East Asian economies. When FDI inflows are compared with fixed assets investments,
the dependence upon foreign investment is even more striking see figure 2). Countries
that have shown a similar or greater degree of dependence than China were either
unable  to  develop  their  own  technological  base  or  faced  a  strong  recession  which
induced a drastic fall in domestic investment. Malaysia is the typical example of an East
Asian  economy  that  has  not  been  able  to  develop  innovation  capabilities  and  to
transform  indigenous  firms  into  global  competitors  Yamamura,  1997,  p. 35  &  FT
Malaysia Report,  2003).  Thailand has reached the Chinese level  of  dependency only
after facing a massive financial crisis involving devaluation and capital flight Thailand
after 1997 on figure 2). The two most successful economies that managed to catch up
the advanced OECD economies – Japan and South Korea – have never experienced that
level  of  dependency.  After the  1997  crisis,  South  Korea  had  to  open  up  its  capital
markets and to increase its level of dependency. This period was a very difficult one for
the South Korean firms which were subject to painful restructurings. However, when
the Korean economy began this rationalisation of production capacities, it  has been
reducing its dependency on FDI inflows see figure 2).
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Figure 2. FDI inflows as a percentage of gross capital formation 1995-2003 in China, Asian and
other emerging economies.
Source: UNCTAD 2000-2004
33 China’s dependency seemed to decrease in 1999 but has been rising again since 2001
despite  the  fact  that  Chinese  domestic  investments  have  beaten  historical  records.
Chinese investments have been over 40% of the GDP in the 2000s Lemoine, 2004, p. 63).
Never such levels had been observed in any other economy during the 20th century.
Exceptionally strong investing economies like Stalinist Soviet Union, post-war Japan or
South Korea in the 1970s managed to reach a ratio of gross capital formation over GDP
of around 30 to 35% (sources: Davies, 1998, p. 40; Gregory, 1990, p. 124; Nakamura, 1995,
p. 210; Lanzarotti, 1992, p. 31; Maddison, 1995, p. 144).
34 This surge in investment can be interpreted as a sign of dynamism by Chinese firms
which are modernizing their equipments. However, a far less brilliant picture emerges
once one looks into other indicators of the Chinese economy. The reasons behind this
high level of investment are widely known. Firstly, credit for State-Owned Enterprise
(SOEs) is extremely cheap which encourages fixed assets investment. This is due to the
Chinese banking system that organises its loans on political and social considerations
rather than on standard capitalist criteria. Despite this surge in domestic investment,
the industrial output of MNEs in China is still rising faster than those of Chinese firms.
This means that the productivity of capital is extremely low for Chinese firms (or that
Chinese investment have an unlikely strong bias in favour of services). Can one apply
the  argument  that  Paul  Krugman  has  developed  over  the  growth  of  the  ASEAN
economies to China (Krugman, 1994, p. 68)? It would imply that the growth of Chinese
firms  is  more  extensive  (using  more  inputs)  than  intensive  (combining  better  the
inputs so as to increase long term productivity). The World Bank and the IMF have
produced statistics that seem to confirm this view. The growth of Chinese output is
mainly due to a high degree of mobilization of inputs, labour and capital, and not to an
improvement of total factor productivity (the combined effect of these inputs). As total
factor  productivity  increase  is  a  proxy for  technological  and managerial know-how
upgrading,  provided  these  figures  are  accurate,  the  impact  of  technological  and
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management upgrading on the Chinese output growth have actually been decreasing
over these last 15 years (Tseng & Rodlauer, 2003). 
35 The OECD has estimated that during the 1990s most of the total productivity gains were
made by foreign firms (OECD, 2001).  Its assessment of the innovative capabilities of
Chinese firm is pessimistic (OECD, 2002). This is confirmed by the rising share of MNEs
in China’s trade. MNEs are importing faster than Chinese firms and faster than the
industrial output. Furthermore the main imports of MNEs are high-tech inputs such as
integrated circuits, plastics, electronic components, and machinery (MOFTEC, 2002, p. 
38).  It  means  that  Chinese  subcontractors  have  not  been  able  to  upgrade  their
technology and take control  of  a  larger  part  of  the production process.  Qualitative
studies show that MNEs are demanding their traditional non-Chinese subcontractor to
follow them and to set up subsidiaries in China rather than to depend upon Chinese
subcontractors  which  cannot  always  reach  the  international  standards  in  terms  of
quality (Taylor, 2000, p. 139; Kim & Lee, 2004, p. 7; Nam, 2004, p. 14). 
36 The share of Chinese exports produced by MNEs has been rising until the mid 1990s
when it  stabilized above the 50% (see figure 3).  Huang has shown that Asian newly
industrialised countries (NICs) never had to rely so heavily on MNEs for their exports.
At their highest peak, MNEs were responsible for 20.6% of Taiwanese manufactured
exports in 1980 and 29% of Indonesian manufactured exports in 1995 (Huang, 2003, p. 
32). Looking at China’s export structure, it is clearly visible that MNEs dominate the
exports  which  are  intensive in  technology  and  capital.  Already  in  1995,  MNEs
accounted for more than 83% of the electronic and electric appliances (Huang, 2003, p. 
32) While textile accounts for more than 25% of Chinese exports (Dickson, 2003, p. 198),
MNEs located in China mostly export components, household appliance and machinery.
Textile  products  are  not  even  among  the  most  important  export  values  of  MNEs
(MOFTEC, 2002, p. 36). 
 
Figure 3. The impact of MNEs on China’s imports and exports.
Source: MOFTEC, 2002
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Outward FDI flows and the acquisition of O-advantages
37 These  figures  do  not  per  se  rule  out  the  possibility  of  Chinese  global  competitors
emerging.  Some  advanced  economy  receives  massive  inflows  of  FDI  which  are
responsible for a substantial part of the country’s exports while hosting some large
national firms able to compete globally.
38 If  Chinese firms are  really  acquiring O-advantages  in  their  sectors  of  activity,  they
should  be  able  to  follow  the  path  of  international  expansion  laid  down  by  their
Japanese  and  Korean  predecessors.  Outward  FDI  flows  reflect  the  possession  of  O-
advantages. Indeed, in order to create subsidiaries abroad, a profit maximising firm
must be able to overcome the barriers to entry that exist in its sector of activity. At first
glance, the Chinese firms seem to be in such a situation. These last years, a growing
number of Chinese firms have been opening subsidiaries or acquiring foreign firms. FDI
outward flows have been rising steadily  these  last  fifteen years.  In  absolute  terms,
Chinese FDI outflows even overtook those of South Korea in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 
384). Nevertheless, many elements counterbalance these figures. 
39 Firstly, Chinese firms only invest a minor share of their total investment abroad and
this share has been shrinking these last two years (see figure 4). It is still far lower than
the  share  currently  reached by  the  Asian  NICs.  China’s  current  data  are  not  more
impressive when compared to South Korea’s data for the period 1986-1990 (when the
Korean  chaebol  were  turning  into  major  global  competitors).  For  this  period,  the
average share of outward FDI in gross capital formation stood at 1.4% compared to an
average of 0.76% for China from 1998 to 2002. The exceptional performance of Taiwan
in terms of FDI outflows also reveals a worrying trend for mainland China. Most of
Taiwan’s FDI flows are directed to China, reflecting the O-advantages held by Taiwanese
firms over their mainland competitors.
 
Figure 4. FDI outflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation 1995-2003 in China and
other Asian or emerging economies.
Source: UNCTAD 2000-2004
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40 Secondly, Chinese firms are not always acting on their own. Their expansion abroad is
sponsored, sometime driven, by the central government if these firms belong to its list
of  national  champions  (see  below  section  3.3)  (APCO,  2003,  p. 50).  Are  these
government-sponsored  FDI  outflows  based  on  long-term  profitability  or  are  they
overambitious schemes created for political prestige? The take-over of foreign firms is
seen by the Chinese government and Chinese firms as a mean to acquire technology. In
2004, China National Blue Star Group projected to buy a majority stake in Ssangyong
Motor, South Korea’s fourth-largest carmaker. In 2002, BOE Technology of China took
over the flat panel display-making arm of South Korea’s Hynix Semiconductor. Gee has
shown  that  this  strategy  produced  disappointing  results  in  the  case  of  Taiwan.
Taiwanese leaders like ACER have acquired companies in the USA in order to improve
their  innovative  capacities  but  have  met  little  success  because  of  the  different
management styles, the lack of motivation of American staff or because the best US
researchers  moved  to  other  US  companies  (Gee,  1992,  p. 37).  Chinese  overseas
expansion could create more debt than opportunities of upgrading technological and
management capabilities. The extent of government support behind the FDI outflows
questions  the  fact  that  these  flows  reflect  a  real  ability  by  Chinese  firms  to  open
subsidiaries on their own.
41 Thirdly,  some  of  the  biggest  Chinese  investors  abroad  are  in  the  mining  and  oil
industries. Most of their FDI does not reflect O-advantages on the global market but the
will  from  the  Chinese  government  to  insure  access  to  strategic  raw materials.  For
example,  in  2003,  China National  Offshore Oil  Corporation has  invested about  A$ 1
billion in Australia’s Gorgon gas field. However, the effective operator of the gas field is
Chevron Texaco and no technological transfer is programmed (FT, 24/10/2003). Again
this year, Chinese FDI to control Indonesia oilfields followed the same logic. 
42 Fourthly,  one must not forget that in 2001 more than 55% of  Chinese FDI outflows
ended  in  Hong-Kong  (APCO,  2003,  p. 50).  A  substantial  part  of  these  flows  are  not
generated by firm possessing O-advantages but by SOEs investing in Hong-Kong for
other  purposes  than  launching  an  economic  activity.  Some  investments  can  be
politically motivated to create stronger links between the territory and the mainland.
For example, the largest “foreign” investor in Hong-Kong is the China International
Trust Investment Corporation whose chairman is Larry Yung, the son of China’s vice
president  (Monde  Diplomatique,  2003  (06),  p. 11).  Other  Chinese  FDI  outflows  are
transiting by Hong-Kong to be transformed into FDI originating from Hong Kong to the
mainland.  Chinese  capital  is  thereby  transformed  into  “foreign”  capital,  the  latter
benefiting from the same private property rights than the genuine FDI flows to the
mainland.  This  transformation is  particularly  useful  for  the  managers  of  SOEs  who
misappropriate the state assets of their company. According to various analysts, this
phenomenon accounts for between 7 to 25% of all Chinese FDI inward flows (Huang,
2003, p. 38). 
43 This mechanism of “roundtrip” FDI generates ambiguous results on the conclusions
reached in the analysis so far. The positive aspect for Chinese firms is that the Chinese
investors are doing much better relatively to foreign investors in China than official
statistics suggest. As some Chinese capitalists are channelling capital through Hong-
Kong and off-shore centre like the Virgin Islands to benefit from better property rights,
it means that some Chinese investors might create new private firms and provide them
with liquidity. Nevertheless, the lack of disaggregated figures forbids any conclusion on
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the  precise  nature  of  roundtrip  FDI.  Roundtrip  FDI  can  also  end  in  Guangdong
province’s  real  estates  or  in  other  speculative  activities.  The  negative  aspect  is  of
course that many Chinese foreign investors do not possess O-advantages when they
invest in Hong-Kong. 
44 One certain positive progress lies in the capacities that some large Chinese firms have
acquired  thanks  to  the  huge  Chinese  public  works.  These  firms  can  now  provide
services in construction and utilities for large third world countries. It has been the
case  for  the  reconstruction  of  Alger’s  airport  or  for  China  Telecom  expansion  in
Indonesia (FT, 24/09/2003). Nevertheless, these examples show that Chinese firms are
still far from the upper segment of the world market; that is gaining access to OECD
public works and utilities.
45 Despite this bleak general outlook of the overall performance of Chinese firms, it is still
possible than a handful of them possess O-advantages. As it has been mentioned before,
operating at a sufficient size is essential in activities characterised by high barriers to
entry which often incur high fixed costs and therefore economies of scale. The next
section examine the size and the performance of the largest Chinese firms compared to
those of their global competitors.
 
Are the largest Chinese firms acquiring O-advantages?
46 In 2001, the year China formally joins the WTO, 11 Chinese firms belonged to the top
500 global firms in terms of sales (Fortune, 2002, F-27). This performance has only been
matched by South Korea,  while  only two firms of  the top 500 were based in other
ASEAN countries or in Taiwan. However, it would be difficult to claim that any could
qualify  as  MNEs  possessing  O-advantages.  They  are  in  the  sectors  of  utilities,  oil
refining and banking.  Two companies,  Sinochem and Cofco,  were in  trading.  These
eleven firms are SOEs who operate almost exclusively on their domestic market. 
 
Figure 5. The return on assets of the largest Chinese and Korean firms in 2001 (in %).
Source: Fortune 500, 2002
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47 By looking at the return on assets, six of them are doing far worse than the average of
their largest global competitors (Fortune, 2002). These figures are not surprising for
some activities. It is widely known that the performance of the largest Chinese state-
owned banks (often referred as the “big four”) is appalling. By international standards,
the “big four” are considered to be bankrupt and have been bailed out by the central
government three times in five years (CEPII, 2004 & the Economist, 20001,19/05/01 &
Le Monde, 2003, 08/08/03). The profitability of the two oil refining companies is less
catastrophic but they are visibly overstaffed compared to their global competitors (see
figure 6). These two firms own too many refineries operating at a too small scale to be
cost-efficient (Nolan, 2002, p. 50). Their distribution networks are lagging far behind
those of their global counterparts. Finally, both companies are not strong in the high-
value added segments of the oil products (Nolan, 2002, p. 51). In terms of R&D, none of
these eleven firms belongs to the 300 biggest spenders (Nolan, 2002, p. 47). 
 
Figure 6. The capital intensity of the largest Chinese and South Korean firms in 2001: the amount
of assets per employee of the firm compared to the average of its industry within the global top 500
(in %).
Source: Fortune 500, 2002
48 The satisfactory profitability of the Chinese firms in telecoms and trading can probably
be better explained by the lack of competition on the Chinese domestic market in these
activities than by a mastering of technology and management. In 2001, these activities
are still closed to foreign investors and the WTO accession protocol signed by China has
scheduled  a  progressive  liberalisation  that  will  not  be  completed  before  2004-2006
(Beseler,  2002,  p. 6).  The  dominant  position  of  these  giant  firms  on  their  non
contestable domestic markets enables them to achieve high profit margins but it does
not mean per se that they have yet acquired O-advantage. 
49 The Chinese champions in other activities are still too small to make it in the global top
500  in  terms  of  sales.  However  by  any  standards,  there  are  far  below their  global
competitors in terms of sales, R&D spending. Many of them are losing domestic market
share to foreign competitors.  Nolan has outlined such weaknesses in the aerospace,
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pharmaceuticals, electrical goods, automobile, coal and steel industries (Nolan, 2002,
pp. 48-56). Even successful known Chinese brands like Haier, Kelon in the white good
industries  and  Lenovo  (formerly  Legend)  in  computers  are  small  in  terms  of  sales
compared to their global competitors. In 1998, Kelon was still ten times smaller than a
mid-size US firms like Maytag (Huang, 2003, p. 195). In these activities, Chinese firms
have  not  yet  managed  to  upgrade  their  products  and  are  still  stuck  in  the  lower
segment of the markets characterised by lower profit margins (Nolan, 2002, pp. 48-56;
Huang, 2003, p. 196). 
50 Overall,  the  performance  of  the  largest  Chinese  firms  is  much  worse  than  the
performance of their largest global competitors which originate mainly from Japan,
North  America  and  Europe.  But  even  if  one  looks  at  global  firms  from  a  newly
industrialised Asian economy like South Korea, the difference of performance is also
striking. The comparison of capital intensity reveals that Chinese firms are far more
overstaffed than their Korean competitors (see figure 6). Two third of the South Korean
chaebol have a higher return than the average of their industry, most of them in capital
or  technology intensive  sectors  (Fortune,  2002).  On the poor  performing last  third,
three of the four companies are in the trading industries which cannot be considered as
a  technology  intensive  industry.  In  terms  of  capital  intensity,  9  of  the  12  chaebol 
belonging  to  the  Fortune  500 are  more  capital  intensive  than the  average  of  their
largest competitors while it is just the opposite for all the 11 Chinese firms which are
far more labour-intensive than the average of their industry (see figure 6). 
51 One could always argue that Chinese firms are only beginning their transformation into
global  competitors  benefiting  from O-advantages.  Therefore,  a  relevant  comparison
should not look at the current figures of the Japanese and Korean global firms but at
the figures  when they first  joined the world largest  firms.  Nevertheless,  even with
these figures, the performance of the Chinese largest is far from impressive. Japanese
keiretsu in the early 1960s, when they started their international expansion were in a
much more favourable situation that Chinese firms today. They had higher returns on
assets than most of the Chinese largest firms of 2001 (see figure 7). Seven out of the
twelve Japanese largest firms were more capital intensive than the average of the firms
of  their  industry  belonging to  the global  top 500.  The remaining five  were not  far
behind except for the oil industry (see figure 8). This conclusion also holds for most of
the Korean chaebol of the mid 1980s (see figures 7 & 8). On a macroeconomic level, the
share of outward FDI flows in the gross domestic gross capital formation is 75% higher
in the Korean economy of the late 1980s that in the Chinese economy of 2003. The
Korean  firms  of  1985  were  therefore,  on  average,  far  more  advanced  in  the
internationalisation of their operations than the Chinese champions of the 2000s.
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Figure 7. The return on assets of the largest Chinese firms in 2001, Japanese firms in 1961 and
Korean firms in 1985 (in %). 
Source: Fortune 500, 1962-2002
 
Figure 8. The capital intensity of the largest Chinese firms in 2001, Japanese firms in 1961 and
Korean firms in 1985: the amount of assets per employee of the firm compared to the average of its
industry (in %).
Source: Fortune 500, 1962-2002
 
The prospects of the largest Chinese firms
52 The preceding section has pointed out that, at best, only a handful of Chinese firms can
claim to be close to acquiring O-advantages and not in the most technology-intensive
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activities. A comparison with the past situations of Japanese keiretsu and Korean chaebol
does not fit with the optimistic scenario over China’s economic development described
in the introduction. However, some could argue that Chinese firms are only in the early
stage of the acquisition of O-advantages. They would be in a similar situation than the
one once experienced by the large firms of relatively advanced East Asian economies
such as South Korea. 
 
Can the largest Chinese firms follow the footsteps of the keiretsu
and the chaebol? 
53 In order to see if the largest Chinese firms can hope to meet the same success than
their Korean competitors, it is necessary to study in minute detail the emergence of
South Korea’s chaebol. Some of the evidence corroborates the spin-off effects generated
by FDI that has been described above. During the 1960s, the government encouraged
export-oriented FDI to restore their trade deficit problem and to acquire technological
capabilities. Exports of transistors started in 1962 made by companies such as Motorola
or Signaletics.  They were followed by Japanese-Korean joint ventures like Samsung-
Sanyo, Toshiba and Goldstar-Alps electronics. The government offered incentives and
privileges to MNEs such as fiscal exemptions (Hobday, 1995, p. 58). During the 1960s,
foreign firms dominated the sectors in which they were present. Korean firms played
the role of subcontractors for the foreign MNEs. Thanks to technological spin-off, they
progressively upgraded their technological capabilities, taking control of a larger part
of the production chain. As early as the 1970s, the Korean firms were moving from
providing simple components to their foreign contractors to the complete production
of low-tech consumer goods (Hobday, 1995, p. 59). They developed their own brands
and R&D in the 1980s and by the 1990s, some had become successful global competitors
such as Samsung and LG. But this would be a very narrow view of the diffusion of
technology and managerial know-how in South Korea. 
54 According to the optimists, some Chinese firms are now well into the second stage in
which they are upgrading their technological capabilities and moving from providing
simple components to their foreign contractors to the complete production of low-tech
consumer goods. Some analysts even believe that thanks to its size and the massive FDI
inflows, China could leapfrog the Asian NICs (Chen, 2004, p. 15; Nam, 2004, p. 22; The
Economist,  25/08/2001,  p. 57).  Despite  obvious  cases  of  technological  upgrading  by
Chinese firms, it would be difficult to follow the steps of the chaebol. A deeper analysis
of the transformation of some chaebol into MNEs shows that it has necessitated more
conditions than simply the presence of MNEs and subcontracting agreements. 
55 Firstly,  the  international  environment  proved decisive  in  the  acquisition of  foreign
technology by the chaebol  and in gaining access on foreign markets.  Because of the
Korean War and the Cold War, the successive American administrations gave South
Korea a preferential economic treatment. They provided a very important aid package.
From 1953 to 1975, US aid to South Korea amounted to $13 billions (Jones, 1997, p. 69).
This aid package helped to relieve the serious post-war food shortages and to finance
the land reform but it also generated long-lasting effects. US financial flows provided
South Korea with foreign currency during the first decade after the war at a time when
there were virtually no Korean exports. During this period, US aid funds financed 70%
of all imports and amounted to 80% of the fixed capital investment (Lanzarotti, 1992, p. 
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36). US military aid also enabled South Korea to avoid paying for its defence costs until
the 1970s. This saving certainly helped the government to increase the level of public
spending on education, which rose from less than 3% at the end of the war to 22% in
1987 (Hobday, 1995, p. 54). Military co-operation also gave the young Koreans drafted
into military duty a valuable technical training. The Korean army built infrastructure
thanks to American technical assistance (Lanzarotti, 1992, p. 40). This proved crucial in
an economy crippled by a shortage of engineers and trained technicians (Hobday, 1995,
p. 53). Lastly, the US administrations helped the South Korean economy by providing a
privileged access to its domestic market (Jones, 1997, p. 79). Until the 1980s, successive
US  administrations  were  cautious  not  to  block  imports  from  South  Korea.  The  US
administrations also favoured the integration of South Korea in the world economic
community as a member of the GATT and later of the OECD.
56 Secondly, the chaebol developed under strong state protection as the successive South
Korean  governments  were  strongly  influenced  by  the  Japanese  model  of  industrial
policy and management (Hobday,  1995,  p. 22).  Under the dictatorial  rule  of  General
Park, an Economic Planning Board was established based on the model of the Japanese
MITI.  The  Ministry  of  Commerce  and  the  Ministry  of  Finance  designed  jointly  the
industrial policy based on a co-management system between the state and the private
sector (Jones, 1997, p. 71). In 1973, the government decided to encourage a shift from
light industry such as footwear and textile to capital-intensive industries. The Heavy
and Chemical Industry Plan was launched and resulted in the emergence of the chaebol
conglomerates in strategic industries: iron and steel, machinery, non-ferrous metals,
electronics, shipbuilding, automobile and petrochemicals (Jones, 1997, p. 72).
57 In the late  1970s and during the 1980s,  the government protected some sectors  by
restricting  entry  to  foreign  firms  and  forcing  them  to  enter  the  domestic  market
through joint-ventures with the major local firms such as Hyundai, Daewoo, Goldstar
and Samsung. They also encouraged Japanese firms to disinvest by terminating their
tax break policy for foreign investors. They developed a negative list of sectors closed
to foreign firms on national security grounds. Foreign firms like the Japanese NEC were
forced out of their former joint-ventures and had to close down their subsidiaries in
South Korea (Hobday, 1995, p. 53).
58 The  success  of  the  chaebol  has  been  quite  impressive.  Nevertheless,  as  it  has  been
described in section 1, all of these firms still depend on Japanese technology for high-
tech inputs and machinery. The technological gap between Korean and Japanese firm
seems to widen. Overall,  one could claim that even though some chaebol  possess O-
advantages and have been able to invest  abroad,  the South Korean entrepreneurial
class  does  not  enjoy  similar  innovative  and  management  capabilities  than  its
counterparts from the advanced OECD economies.
59 From the account of the emergence of the chaebol described above, can one expect the
Chinese firms to imitate the chaebol’s impressive -though not quite complete- catching
up of the most technologically advanced competitors from the US, Japan or the EU?
What is certain is that the path taken by the chaebol or by the Japanese zaibatsu-keiretsu 
during the 20th century is blocked for Chinese firms. China will not benefit from the
exceptionally  favourable  environment  enjoyed  by  Japanese  and  then  South  Korean
newcomers  because  of  three  major  changes  in  the  world  economy  and  one
characteristic of the Chinese economy. 
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Four differences between China and the development of the East
Asian advanced economies
A different international environment
60 Firstly, the attitude of the world largest economic, military and technological power,
the United States, towards China is completely different from the special relationship
enjoyed by East Asian economies like Japan, South Korea or Taiwan. In the 1950s, 1960s
and 1970s, these countries benefited from massive financial aid packages (Lanzarotti,
1992). As important, they also received freely substantial technology and managerial
know-how transfers because of the context of the Cold War (Friedman, 1993, p. 275).
The US provided the Japanese and South Korean manufacturers  with an important
outlet for their exports during the Korean and Vietnam wars (Samuels, 1994, p. 133;
Cook, 1996, p. 170). The procurements of the American army accounted for more than
70% of the Japanese exports from 1950 to 1952 (Samuels, 1994, p. 133). As it has been
mentioned before,  the USA had a sufficient leverage to impose the reintegration of
Japan in the international capitalist community and to push for the accession of Japan
or South Korea in multilateral institutions like the GATT or the OECD. Furthermore,
South Korean exports were given a preferential access to the US market until the 1980s
(Jones, 1997, p. 79).
61 The attitude of the United States and the other OECD economies towards China today is
very different from what experienced Japan or South Korea decades earlier. The rate of
growth of the OECD economies is considerably slower today than during the 1960s and
1970s.  Despite  considerable  progress  in  liberalisation  of  trade  during  the  Uruguay
round  of  the  GATT,  the  United  States  have  been  using  more  often  unilateralist
protectionist measures (Van Der Wee, 1990, p. 334; Rainelli, 1996, p. 107; Pantz, 1998, p. 
58; Ito, 1996, p. 375). President Bush considers China as a “strategic competitor” rather
than “a strategic partner”. China has faced very harsh conditions imposed by both the
US and the EU during the negotiations for its accession to the WTO in 1999. China has
been  imposed  a  “transitional  product-specific  safeguard  mechanism”  (TPSSM)  that
enables until December 2013 WTO members to impose special tariffs on Chinese exports
should they increase fast and create “a market disruption”. China’s accession protocol
to the WTO was certainly the harshest imposed on any new member by the United
States  (Holbig,  2002,  p. 25).  In  2004,  China  is  still  being  refused  to  be  granted  the
“market economy” status by the US and the EU. This offers WTO members a wider
degree  of  freedom  in  launching  antidumping  cases  against  Chinese  exports
(paradoxically  this  status  was  given  to  Russia  when  most  experts  on  transition
economies believe that China is  more advanced in its  transition toward a capitalist
market economy). Thus, China’s access to international markets is subject to potential
discretionary unilateral protection measures by any WTO member.
 
More obstacles to the acquisition of technology by Chinese firms 
62 The acquisition of technology will be more difficult for Chinese than for their Japanese
and Korean counterparts. China can be certain not to benefit from the free transfer of
technology of the cold war mentioned above. On the contrary, the new rules imposed
by the WTO make technological acquisition more problematic than during the youth of
the  chaebol.  At  the  Uruguay  round  of  negotiations  (1986-1994),  the  OECD  business
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community called for the creation of a multilateral institutional framework to enforce
the intellectual property rights (Hoekman, 2001, p. 279). Copyright protection has been
extended to a minimum of 50 years and its coverage extends to programs and data
(Hoekman, 2001, p. 285). Industrial design and integrated circuits design are protected
for a period of ten years (Hoekman, 2001, p. 286). Almost all inventions are protected by
a patent of at least 20 years (Hoekman, 2001, p. 288). The development of the IPR rules
has  created  a  completely  new  environment  for  the  emerging  firms  of  developing
countries compared to the situation of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s when the Asian NICs
upgraded  their  technology,  often  in  a  manner  that  would  now  considered  non
compatible with the WTO IPR rules. 
63 The Chinese  government  has  been using  various  mechanisms  to  attempt  to  funnel
foreign technology.  Thanks to its  potentially  huge domestic  market,  the bargaining
position  of  the  Chinese  government  could  impose  technological  transfers  by  MNEs
investing  in  China.  Many  MNEs  were  forced  to  joint  venture  agreements  which
sometimes required technology transfer (APCO, 2003, p. 43) while others had to develop
R&D facilities in China (Kim & Lee, 2004, p. 16). Chinese authorities were very lenient on
copyright  abuses  by  Chinese  firms.  Regulations  over  IPR  were  very  loose  in  China
before its accession to the WTO. When such legislation existed, it was seldom enforced.
For example, in 1992, the Shenzhen Reflective Materials Institute was found to have
copied 650,000 Microsoft Corporation trademark holograms. After two years of judicial
procedure, the Institute was fined only $ 252. In contrast Chinese courts have imposed
the death penalty for those who have traded in famous liquor and cigarettes and the
trademark  holder  was  awarded  compensation  of  $115,000  (Gregory,  1990,  p. 330).
Furthermore,  domestic  firms do  not  always  pay  the  fine  and it  is  not  always  fully
collected by the courts (Gregory, 1990, p. 331). The leniency of Chinese courts on IPR
violation has enabled Chinese firms to access cheaply to some foreign technology. 
64 However, these mechanisms of technology transmission might prove more difficult to
apply for three reasons. Firstly, in order to join the WTO, China had to adopt a legal
framework to enforce IPR in China. Progress in that area have been slow the two first
years  after  China’s  accession but  they have been accelerating these last  18  months
under the pressure of the US, Japan and the EU (APCO, 2003, p. 43). IPR violations are
likely to decrease or China might face unilateral and multilateral sanctions. Secondly,
when MNEs operating in technology intensive sectors decide to set up in China, they
increasingly opt for the creation of a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary rather than to
enter in a joint-venture agreement with a Chinese partner (Luo, 2000, p. 26 & APCO,
2003). Thirdly, China’s bargaining position could weaken as other large economies are
getting more attractive to MNEs both in terms of market size and skilled labour. The
recent  transformation  of  the  Indian  economy  is  generating  a  magnet  for  FDI.  The
ASEAN  economies  are  trying  to  transform  the  ASEAN  Free  Trade  Area  as  a  truly
integrated market for goods and service.  If  the objectives of  the Concord II  project
decided  in  the  ASEAN  summit  of  Bali  in  November  2003  are  met,  then  it  could
strengthen  the  ASEAN  attractiveness  to  MNEs  relatively  to  China’s.  Nesadurai  has
pointed  out  that  some  MNEs  are  already  developing  a  “two-pronged  investment
strategy” between China and the ASEAN, deciding to opt for one country or the other
according to the local environment provided to host FDI (Nesadurai, 2003, p. 185). If
such occurrences take place, the Chinese authorities will not be able to impose on MNEs
too demanding conditions over technology transfers. 
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65 Although the Chinese government’s latitude will be limited by the factors mentioned
above, there is still scope for potential technology transfer from MNEs through human
capital. Even without government pressure or incentives, many MNEs prefer to invest
R&D facilities in China to improve “time to market” and to be able to react quicker to a
volatile demand keen on new differentiated products (Kim & Lee, 2004, p. 16). Some
MNEs have recently established R&D centres for product development aimed at the
Chinese  market  (Chen,  2004,  p. 13).  MNEs  are  attracted  by  the  cheap  price  and
availability of high-quality Chinese engineers (Chen, 2004, p. 13). This enabled world
class firms like IBM, Microsoft, BAE, Motorola and Intel to engage in basic technology
research in China in collaboration with Chinese universities and state-funded research
institutes (Chen, 2004, p. 14; APCO, 2003, p. 45). Marshallian districts in R&D (clusters of
laboratories,  pool of qualified personal,  improved higher education institutes) could
emerge and generate external economies of scale which could in the mid run benefit
indirectly to Chinese firms.  However one must keep in mind that most of  the R&D
facilities  built  in  China  by  MNEs  target  product  development  research.  Product
innovation and fundamental research are not pursued by MNEs subsidiaries in China.
In that strategic field, China is still lagging far behind OECD economies and even behind
India  (APCO,  2003,  p. 45).  There  is  still  no  evidence  of  major  Chinese  technological
leaders in their sectors that could compare with the chaebol in terms of indigenous
technological innovation capabilities. Chinese firms in technology-intensive sectors are
small in scale and scattered (APCO, 2003, p. 44). Furthermore, they face skilled-labour
shortages because of the creaming-off made by MNEs. Overall the Chinese firms willing
to develop world class indigenous innovative capabilities still face the four challenges
outlined above. They display no ability in the mid-run to leapfrog the Western and
Japanese MNEs which remain the incontestable technological leaders of the region.
66 Another  way  to  develop  technological  capabilities  is  for  the  State  to  create  the
infrastructure for the private sector. South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have been
very active in this field for decades. The Chinese government lags far behind in terms
of R&D spending compared to other emerging industrialised economies. The Chinese
government has launched its  five-year “863 Programme” directed to eight strategic
sectors: biotechnology, IT, automation, energy, advanced engineering, marine sciences
and  aerospace.  The  budget  of  this  programme,  if  respected,  is  the  double  of  the
preceding one, reaching US$84.3 billion (APCO, 2003, p. 44). This is still far from the
OECD standards: the EU economies will spend together more than 1000 billions during
the  same  period  (CEPII,  2004,  p. 105;  Devoluy,  2004,  p. 223).  The  latitude  of  the
government on this matter is also limited because of the fast increasing public deficit
and public debt (see below). 
 
A domestic market contested by MNEs 
67 Thirdly,  the global  economic environment has  changed compared to  the 1960s and
1970s.  These  two  decades  were  characterized  by  high  growth  rates  in  the  OECD
countries.  Most  of  the  FDI  flows  were  directed  towards  Europe  and  the  US  then
considered as the main markets. East Asia was not a priority for Western MNEs, some of
which were actually disinvesting out of the region (Yamamura, 1997, p. 37; Yoshihara,
1988). Since the 1990s, Western MNEs have focused much more on East Asia and the US
government has adopted a tougher stance on more open rules for trade and investment
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in  the  region.  It  means  that  the  infant  industries  of  China  face  much  tougher
competition on their regional markets than their Japanese or Korean counterparts did.
68 In the case of Korea, the development of the chaebol can be divided in three stages.
During the first one that occurred in the 1960s, the economy was quite open to FDI and
the  chaebol gained  technological  and  management  know-how  through  their
subcontracting agreements with the subsidiaries of MNEs. During the 1970s until the
mid 1980s, the South Korean government adopted a much more restrictive policy on
FDI inflows. They forbade the presence of MNEs in some industries and services, some
firms were even force to close their subsidiary. Thanks to this privileged access to their
domestic market, the chaebol benefited from economies of scale and learning by doing
effects which increased their competitiveness. This opened the way for the third stage,
the transformation of  the chaebol into MNEs that began to open subsidiaries in the
OECD economies. In the case of the Japanese keiretsu,  MNEs had only a very limited
presence  in  Japan  after  WWII.  Before  1974,  the  Japanese  financial  markets  were
completely  isolated  from  foreign  financial  operators  due  to  high  controls  on
international capital flows (Ito, 1996, p. 316). FDI inflows have been much lower than
the average of the OECD economies (IMF). 
69 Chinese firms face a completely different situation. As it has been mentioned before,
the MNEs account for a very important part of the domestic gross capital formation.
Their shares on the various Chinese markets and in the Chinese exports have been
rising constantly these last two decades generating a growing fear among Chinese firms
(Huang, 2003, p. 16 & p. 334). Furthermore, since MNEs have been welcomed to invest in
China, they have received a privileged treatment from the central and local authorities
in  terms  of  infrastructure  and  taxation  compared  to  the  Chinese  private  firms
(Lemoine, 2004, p. 36). These three last years, the government is reversing slowly this
policy. It claimed that it was thinking about phasing out the special incentive programs
for FDI to put MNEs on an equal footing with Chinese firms. 
 
A domestic market fragmented by competing provincial champions
70 Not  only  will  Chinese  firms  have  to  compete  with  more  advanced  firms  on  their
domestic market, but the degree of integration of the latter is far lower than those of
Korea and Japan in the 1960s. Most of the Chinese domestic market is located in the
coastal and central provinces. The Western mountainous and desert provinces (Tibet,
Yunnan, Xinjiang,  Quinghai and Inner Mongolia)  account for only a minor share of
China’s population and GDP. The lack of infrastructure of the Western provinces might
weaken political  cohesion if  the  divide  continues  to  widen with the richest  coastal
province.  However,  the  coastal  and  central  province  could  constitute  a  sufficient
potential  market  if  they would  be  well  integrated.  In  terms  of  transport,  the
infrastructure  for  overseas  transport  is  much  more  developed  than  the  inland
transport systems. Travel time for freight between Shangai and Seattle is shorter than
between Shangai and Chongquing, located only 1600 kilometres away (The Economist,
2001, 10/3/01). During the 1990s, 1000 kilometres of highway were built each year but
the Chinese transportation system is still very inefficient by international standards
(Luo, 2000, p. 113).
71 However, the main cause of the fragmentation of the Chinese domestic market is not
natural  geographic  obstacles  or  the  transport  infrastructure  but  the  protectionist
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policies  adopted  by  the  local  authorities.  Since  1978,  provinces  and  counties  have
gained a tremendous economic autonomy. In order to increase revenue and to check
the unemployment generated by the reforms, the provincial and municipal authorities
began to pursue import-substitutions policies and to develop provincial champions in
capital-intensive  consumer  industries  such as  automobile,  television and household
appliance. To nurture their infant provincial champions, they began to protect their
provincial market from foreign competitors but also from the Chinese firms originating
from other provinces, sometimes crossing the limits of legality to achieve their aim. 
72 During the 1980s, provincial tolls were imposed at the provincial and even county level.
Wedeman mentions the example of the 620-kilometer Liaoning section of the Beijing-
Harbin highway which was cut by 45 permanent and 120 temporary inspection posts to
tax imports, one every 3.8 km. Many provinces on the coast, in the interior or in the
West erected thousands of tolls, some completely illegal (Wedeman, 2003, p. 182). In
1989,  the  interregional  domestic  trade  in  the  words  of  Wedeman  “had  begun  to
resemble trade in medieval Europe or in pre-1911 China” (Wedeman, 2003,  p. 1987).
Apart from tolls,  the government also imposed other forms of tariffs and non-tariff
barriers.
73 Local  governments  pressured  provincial  courts  to  discriminate  against  firms
originating from provinces in commercial disputes. Local officials falsified evidence or
in some instance even connived with criminals to intimidate court officials (Wedeman,
2003, p. 167). The same occurred with local banks. Preferential rates were given to local
firms.  Local  banks went as  far  as  refusing payments to  non-local  bank accounts  or
checks issued to outsiders (Wedeman, 2003, p. 165).
74 These provincial economic wars have peaked in the early 1990s and even caused some
concerns in international institutions like the World Bank who questioned the ability of
the central state to enforce the free movement of goods across China. Since then, many
tolls were lifted in many of the coastal provinces but still exist in the inland provinces.
The practice of provincial tariffs barriers is far from over. As late as 1998, the Shanghai
authorities decided to impose special tax of 15,000 RMB on automobiles not produced
in its municipality (Posth, 2002, p. 93). In 2003, taxi companies in Beijing and Shanghai
still had to buy a part of their fleet from local automobile joint-ventures (e.g. VW for
Shanghai and Hyundai for Beijing). 
75 One could argue that some of these coastal provinces have a larger population than
South Korea and therefore, some of these Chinese provincial champions could hope to
benefit from economies of scale to the same extent that their Korean predecessors did.
Notwithstanding the fact that the GDP of most of these provinces is still much lower
than South Korea’s in the late 1980s (Maddison & OCDE, 2002), the main flaw of this
argument however is that it does not take into account the changes in technology and
in the production process that took place between the mid 1980s (when the chaebol
emerged as global competitors) and the 2000s. Various studies of economies of scale in
the OECD have shown that the minimal efficient size has risen considerably in most of
the technology and capital intensive industries (Aujean, 1986, p. 42; Davies, 1998, p. 113,
Economie Européenne 2,  1994,  p. 5;  Defraigne,  2004,  p. 251).  A domestic  market that
could  have  been  considered  twenty  years  ago  as  sufficiently  large  to  benefit  from
economies of scale and learning by doing effects, would be far too narrow for today’s
firms with the current technology.
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76 The low degree of the integration and the protection enjoyed by provincial champions
over their  Chinese competitors prevent the emergence of  large national  champions
that could benefit from the potential economies of scale secured by a large integrated
domestic market and acquire O-advantage due to experience in large-scale production.
The  result  has  been  the  proliferation  of  small-size  enterprises  in  capital  intensive
sectors such as automobile, refrigerators and other household appliance. For example,
in 1998, there were 115 motor vehicle assembly firms in China, operating on average at
less than 15,000 units per year (Huang, 2003, p. 260). This is to compare with the ten
biggest MNEs whose each produces more than 1,500,000 vehicles a year (Dicken, 2003,
p. 374).
 
Acquiring O-advantages through an ambitious industrial policy? 
77 The central government of China is well aware of the scale and integration problems
that  Chinese  emerging  firms  are  facing.  It  has  been  trying  for  almost  a  decade  to
integrate the domestic market and to develop Chinese national champions.
78 The central government has imposed the lifting of many internal trade barriers. The
accession to the WTO might help it to reassert its authority on Chinese provinces as the
WTO accession protocol does not recognize the provincial level of authority but only
the  national  level.  This  enables  the  central  government  to  claim  that  provincial
barriers must be lifted in order to comply with multilateral trade rule and continue to
access world markets (Kewalram, 2003, p. 415). According to Wedeman, the price wars
between provincial champions of 1998-2000 have let on that provincial authorities have
decided  to  allow  inter-provincial  competition  and  not  to  raise  trade  barriers
(Wedeman, 2003, p. 234). This is a good indicator that after having reached a peak in
disintegration in  1990,  China is  moving towards  the  integration of  internal  market
again.
79 Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has expressed the will to develop national
industrial  champions  (OCDE,  2002,  p. 39).  When  China  joined  the  WTO,  the  central
government has also established a list of national champions in key industries (Nolan,
2002, p. 57) The SASAC (State assets supervision and administration Commission) was
given  full  authority  on  196  SOEs whose  assets  are  worth  834  billions  dollars  and
constitute 55% of  all  state  assets.  These SOEs are the major producers  in oil,  steel,
aerospace, automobile and telecoms. The idea is to merge the 196 existing SOEs into 30
to 50 industrial national  champions (Le Monde,  08/08/2003).  These firms are given
preferential treatment in access to credit,  raw materials and government contracts.
Nevertheless many analysts are sceptical of the success of this industrial policy. 
80 Most among the few Chinese brands known globally like Haier and Kelon are private
enterprises. Lenovo is officially a SOE but its managers negotiated exceptionally well
with the State authorities to get the operating autonomy of a private firm (Huang, 2003,
p. 129).  Lenovo has also been able  to use efficiently the “one country-two systems”
which characterizes the relations between Honk-Kong and the mainland. Most of its
activities on the mainland are made by subsidiaries of its Hong-Kong branch which
benefits  from a  larger  degree  of  autonomy vis-à-vis  the  state  thanks  to  the  island
capitalist institutional structure (Huang, 2005). Furthermore, none of these three firms
were forced to merge with a partner imposed by the State authorities. These firms have
beaten State-owned champions  which benefited  from massive  government  support,
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larger capital investments and a privileged access to credit (Huang, 2003, p. 190). Four
main factors are responsible for the inefficiency of SOEs. 
81 Firstly, despite the fact that the Chinese economy is clearly engaged into its transition
towards capitalism, many SOEs are far from being fully market-oriented as they have to
take  political  and  social  objectives  into  account.  They  provide  a  number  of  social
services in housing, education, health and leisure to their local community. They are
clearly overstaffed as they also have to follow to employment objectives set by local
and  central  states  authorities.  As  for  mergers,  the  champions  targeted  by  the
government are merged with overstaffed inefficient firms (Nolan, 2002, p. 57). This type
of merger imposed by the government does not induce necessarily productivity gains.
Often such mergers are not accompanied by a rationalisation of production capacities.
They  lead  to  giant  enterprises  disposing  of  uncoordinated  similar  small  units  of
production  (Nolan,  2002,  p. 57).  This  absence  of  synergy  means  that  the  Chinese
champions  do  not  benefit  from  economies  of  scale.  A  situation  which  bears  some
analogy with the merger policies adopted by the British government in the 1960s and
1970s which lead to some disasters like British Leyland (Prais, 1974, p. 155; Owen, 1983,
p. 80). 
82 Secondly,  during  the  last  two  decades,  most  SOEs  have  been  riddled  with  the
misappropriation  of  their  assets  by  their  managers.  The  “contract-responsibility”
system launched in the 1980s has given the SOEs a greater control on their profits.
Enterprises  were  authorised  to  keep the  profits  they  made  on quantities  produced
beyond the quotas established by the State plan (Lemoine, 2004, p. 23). Because of this
semi-planned system, SOEs’ managers could order more raw materials than needed for
their  production  purposes  and  sell  them  back  to  private  enterprises  on  the  black
market. In the same manner, they could also benefit from credits at preferential rates
and re-lend them to private firms desperate for more liquidity. According to Chinese
economists,  this  phenomenon  of  misappropriation  of  SOEs  assets  called  guandao
(meaning  in  Chinese  “trade  off  by  officials”)  amounted  to  350  billions  RMB  ($  40
billions) in 1988, almost 25% of China’s GDP (Lin, 1994, p. 206). The Chinese officials
recognise that between 1990 and 1995, a tenth of the state budget disappeared through
guandao (Lemoine, 2004, p. 25). In 2000, an official audit revealed that at least two thirds
of the SOEs continued to falsify their accounts despite the repeated attempt to improve
corporate  governance  (The  Economist,  03/03/01,  p. 72).  The  capital  gains  are  most
often expatriated to overseas safe havens such as the Virgin Islands or to Hong-Kong.
Then they are reinvested to the mainland as  FDI  benefiting from the protection of
property  rights  given to  foreign investors.  Some ends  up in  real  estates,  the  stock
markets or other type of speculation. Other are invested in private firms in the same
branch of activity that the SOEs whose capital  has originally been misappropriated.
This  phenomenon  clearly  weakens  the  efficiency  of  any  state  subsidies  or  merger
policies. 
83 Thirdly,  the  deteriorating  state  finances  restrict  any  ambitious  industrial  policy  in
terms of subsidies and R&D. The share of the budget of the central state in the GDP has
shrunken  by  almost  two-third  since  the  reforms  were  launched  in  1978  (Chinese
Statistical Yearbook, 2003). The public deficit has broken successive records each of the
last two years and stands now above 3% (Financial Times, 06/03/03). The official state
debt amounts to 20% of the GDP but if one adds the non-performing loans of the state-
owned banks (50% of the GDP according to Western analysts) and the liabilities that will
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be generated the future welfare system organised by the state,  the real debt of the
Chinese state is bigger than its GDP (The Economist, Survey of China, 08/04/00; Lyons,
2003). With total state revenues amounting to less than 20% of the GDP in 2003 (half of
the European average) (OCDE, 2002, p. 30), the debt of the Chinese state can cause some
concerns  over  the  feasibility  of  an  ambitious  industrial  policy  to  build  up national
champions with innovative capabilities.
84 Lastly, the government must also prevent the multiplication of competing industrial
policies between the various provinces. The share of the State spending controlled by
the local authorities has been rising during two decades (Lemoine, 2004, p. 34). This
enable  provinces  to  encourage  their  infant  champions  to  compete  with established
provincial champions. The automobile sector reflects that problem. In autumn 2003,
the Chinese government has tried to restrict  entry by new firm in this  sector.  The
objective was to prevent the duplication of production units in a sector already riddled
by overcapacities but the central state could not prevent some provincial champions
specialised in household appliance to attempt producing motor vehicles (FT, 18/09/03).
 
Conclusion
85 The  Chinese  entrepreneurs  and  the  central  government  face  a  challenge  never
experienced  by  preceding  industrialised  latecomers.  The  new  geopolitical
environment,  the new strategies  of  MNEs and the new multilateral  institutions are
putting Chinese firms into a completely different situation than the one encountered
by the Japanese keiretsu or by the Korean chaebol. The technological transfers necessary
to catch up with the global competitors and break away from the “flying geese” pattern
seem much more difficult to achieve for Chinese firms today than it was for their OECD
counterparts decades ago. 
86 This  difficult  situation  could  prevent  the  emergence  of  a  dynamic  Chinese
entrepreneurial  class  willing  to  achieve  autonomy  in  managerial  know-how  and
technological innovation. In that case, Chinese capital holders, like most of their ASEAN
counterparts,  would  probably  turn  into  comprador  capitalists  specialised  in
subcontracting  activities  for  foreign-based  MNEs  or  sheltered  into  state-protected
sectors. The Chinese economy would follow the path of “ersatz capitalism” development
described by Yoshihara and could not catch up with the most advanced flying geese. 
87 To avoid this fate, the Chinese central government has been fighting on four fronts.
Firstly, it is attempting to complete the integration of its domestic market in order to
let  its  biggest  domestic  firms  benefit  fully  from  the  economies  of  scale.  This
necessitates the suppression of internal barriers and of competing provincial industrial
policies.  Secondly,  the  Chinese  government  will  probably  have  to  delay  as  long  as
possible  (that  is  as  long  as  China’s  trading  partners  do  not  take  drastic
countermeasures)  the  application  of  many  of  its  WTO  commitments,  especially  in
matters of IPR and in the opening of the domestic market in strategic sectors. Thirdly,
it  is  attempting to discipline the Chinese banking system in order to channel more
efficiently the Chinese savings to the efficient enterprises and to control the flow of
cheap  credits  that  end  into  counterproductive  investments.  Lastly,  the  Chinese
government  is  trying  to  develop  its  infrastructure  and  human  capital  in  R&D  by
increasing  the  budget  in  these  fields.  The  analysis  above  has  shown  that  these
objectives are far from being reached so far. 
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ABSTRACTS
This article aims at analysing the insertion of the Chinese firms into the East Asian development
process known as the “flying geese” pattern. Its main objective is to assess the capacity of the
Chinese  industrial  champions  to  transform themselves  into  global  competitive  multinational
enterprises  and,  therefore,  the  capacity  of  the  Chinese  economy to  catch  up  with  the  most
advanced East Asian economies like Japan or South Korea. It shows that Japanese and Korean
firms are still the uncontested technological leaders of Asia and that the largest Chinese firms are
far  less  capital  intensive  and  profitable  than  their  Japanese  and  South  Korean  competitors.
Finally,  this  article  looks into the global  changes that  have made extremely difficult  for  the
Chinese industrial champions to follow the successful development path of their Japanese and
South Korean competitors.
Cet article vise à analyser l’insertion des firmes chinoises dans le processus de développement
est-asiatique,  connu sous le nom de “schéma de développement en vol  d’oies sauvages”.  Son
objectif  principal  est  d’évaluer  la  capacité  des  leaders  de  l’industrie  chinoise  à  devenir  des
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entreprises  multinationales  compétitives  et,  partant,  la  capacité  de  l’économie  chinoise  à
rattraper les économies est-asiatiques les plus avancées comme celles du Japon et de la Corée du
Sud.  L’article  démontre que les  firmes japonaises  et  sud-coréennes sont  toujours  les  maîtres
incontestés de l’Asie en matière de technologie, et que les plus grandes sociétés chinoises sont
beaucoup moins “capital intensive” et génératrices de profits que leurs concurrentes japonaises
et sud-coréennes. Enfin, nous examinerons les changements globaux qui se sont traduits, pour les
leaders de l’industrie chinoise, par des difficultés énormes pour arriver à suivre les voies d’un
développement qui a si bien réussi au Japon et à la Corée du Sud.
INDEX
Mots-clés: économie internationale, économie est-asiatique, économie chinoise, IDE,
multinationales, avantages spécifiques à la firme, capacités d’innovation, développement
Keywords: international economy, East Asian economy, Chinese economy, FDI, multinational
enterprises, ownership-specific advantages, innovation capabilities, development
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